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ABSTRACT
In the recent past, major increases in the loan loss reserves by
several money center banks have focused the attention of academicians,
the financial community, and regulators on the implications of such
decisions for the earnings of those banking firms as well as on their
ability to weather major borrower defaults in the medium and long run.
This study examines the process by which a bank determines the
size of its loan loss reserve ratios in a particular point in time, as
well as over a period of time. These decisions are influenced by many
internal forces as well as competition, regulation, and tax factors.
This work approaches the bank's decision with respect to loan loss
reserve ratios from a decision-theoretic standpoint. Actual decisions
are examined within the framework of a Bayesian decision model, and
conclusions are obtained with respect to the relative sizes of the
penalties for overestimation and underestimation of the loan loss
reserve ratios, given a loss function which implies a normative deci-
sion rule consistent with the principle of expected utility maximiza-
tion.

THE LOAN RESERVE DECISION IN LARGE COMMERCIAL BANKS
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, several large commercial banks made headlines by making
dramatically large additions to their loan loss reserves. These large
provisions for loan losses resulted from management decisions that
were reportedly driven by the deterioration in the quality of bank
loans to less developed countries. Besides affecting reported
accounting earnings, these additions to loan loss reserves affect
bank capital as currently defined. American commercial banks now
operate under uniform minimum capital requirements (see Gilbert,
Stone, and Trebing [1985]) that can act as constraints on a variety of
bank decisions, including the decision about the size of the loan loss
provision. Recently, the U.S. and 11 other major industrial nations
reached a final agreement to produce uniform capital requirements for
banks in these countries by the end of 1992 (see Cash [1988]).
Little has been written about the process by which a bank deter-
mines the size of its loan loss provision and, by implication, the
size of its loan loss reserve, for any particular period. Most of the
existing analyses of this problem focus on a regulatory and/or an ana-
lysts viewpoint, with a consequent emphasis on the decision output
(i.e., the dollar amounts of the provision and the resulting loan loss
reserve) , as well as on the meaning and measurement aspects of several
reserve ratios and the information conveyed by them with respect to
the adequacy of the bank's loan loss reserve. A good example of this
approach is Cates [1983]. Other studies have examined the tax aspects
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relating to the provision for loan losses and the impact of an
increase in the loan loss reserve on a bank's stock price, that is,
"the informational and economic effects of loan loss reserve changes"
(see Henderson [1987] and Grammatikos and Saunders [1988]). The work
of George Vojta [1973a, 1973b], however, is an important exception.
Vojta attempted to examine the decision process of the banking firm,
which ultimately results in choices for the provision for loan losses
and, a fortiori, for the loan loss reserve. This study represents one
additional step in the direction proposed by Vojta, with the use of
empirical decision-theoretic methods.
The process of arriving at a decision concerning the size of the
loan loss reserve is of fundamental importance to the banking firm.
This is so because this decision has implications for a bank's regula-
tory capital and because of the asymmetric nature of the penalties
associated with making a set of decisions over time which may be
either too conservative or too aggressive. A bank that is con-
sistently "conservative" in its decision with respect to the provision
for loan losses (i.e., the provision consistently exceeds the actual
loss by a large amount) will experience reduced reported earnings and
a reduction in its internally sustainable growth rate holding leverage
constant. On the other hand, a bank that is consistently "aggressive"
(i.e., the provision consistenly falls short of actual losses) will
experience increased regulatory attention, pressures to increase capi-
tal and, if losses are severe enough, ultimate bankruptcy. Notice
that the same reasoning applies with respect to the level of the ratio
of loan loss reserves to total loans or net loans. A "conservative"
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bank is one whose loan loss reserve to total loans ratio is con-
sistently above the peer norm (say, the average of peer banks).
Likewise, an "aggressive" bank is one whose loan loss reserve to total
loans ratio remains consistently below the norm for its peers.
Indeed, one can argue that the level of the loan loss reserve or its
ratio to total loans or net loans is the fundamental decision, and
treat the decision with respect to the provision for loan losses as a
2
residual decision.
In this study, we examine the process by which a commercial bank
determines the size of its loan loss reserves (or the level of the
ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans or net loans) for any par-
ticular period. This decision is influenced by many internal bank
factors as well as competition, regulation, and tax factors. We will
focus the discussion on the theoretical and statistical properties of
optimal decisions with respect to the loan loss reserve. In order to
develop this firm decision-making point of view, we will approach this
problem with the aid of a decision-theoretic or Bayesian statistical
model. We will argue that this model produces a normative decision
rule which is consistent with the principle of maximization of
expected utility while being intuitive and flexible. This model is
then used to investigate the loan loss reserve decisions of large U.S.
banks in the period 1982-1986.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
major building blocks of this decision-theoretic model: the loss
function, the prior distribution, and the likelihood function. In
particular, the problem of the appropriate form for the loss function
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is discussed, given its pivotal role in the derivation of the decision
rule. Section 3 applies Bayesian analysis to the problem at hand. A
Bayes estimate for the ratio of the loan loss reserve to total loans
is derived in this section. In Section 4, this methodology is applied
to a sample of large U.S. commercial banks in the period 1982-1986.
Time series data on actual ratios of the loan loss reserves to total
loans are used to generate data-based prior distributions for this
ratio. Cross-sectional data is then combined with the time series
information and a posterior distribution for the ratio of loan loss
reserves to total loans results. Actual ratios are then compared with
the parameters of the posterior distribution, and inferences result
with respect to the relative size of the parameters in the loss func-
tion which represent penalties for the overestimation and underestima-
tion of loan loss reserves. Finally, Section 5 presents the
conclusions of this study, a discussion of the limitations of this
methodology, and some suggestions for future studies.
2. THE MODEL
A schematic view of the logic of Bayesian decisions as applied to
the problem under study is presented in Figure 1. The three major
building blocks which contribute to the bank's decision with respect
to the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans are (i) its prior
information (including, but not limited to, a time series of loan loss
reserve ratios), (ii) contemporaneous information (represented by a
cross section of the most recent ratios of loan loss reserves to total
loans for banks with similar size and other characteristics), and
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(iii) a loss function, whose parameters represent the bank's view of
the penalties associated with underestimation or overes t imat ion of
loan losses. According to Bayesian decision theory, the prior distri-
bution and the likelihood function combine to form a posterior distri-
bution for the ratio loan loss reserves to total loans, which is the
source of all inferences. Given the choice of the loss function, it
becomes possible to obtain a point estimate for this ratio which mini-
mizes expected posterior loss and therefore maximizes expected uti-
lity. In this study, the actual bank decisions with respect to the
ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans are then compared to the
Bayes decision and inferences are made with respect to the parameters
of the hypothesized loss function.
One major advantage of this approach is that it mimics the actual
decision process carried out by the banking firm. Clearly, when
deciding the dollar amount to be allocated to the provision for loan
losses in the next period (quarter or year), the bank's senior manage-
ment considers the history of its past decisions and the most recent
3loan loss reserve decisions of its peer banks. In addition, some non
data-based prior information, such as taxes and law or regulation, is
4
also relevant (see Figure 1). We now turn to a more specific
discussion of the loan function and prior information.
2 . 1 The Loss Function
A loss function is one of the basic components of a decision-
theoretic statistical model. The equivalence of utility maximiza-
tion and loss minimization is well known. In this study, we have
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considered two types of loss functions, namely, the squared error loss
and the linear loss. The squared error loss has the form
L(9,a) = (8-a) 2 (1)
where 9 is the parameter of interest (i.e., the ratio of actual loan
losses to total loans) and a is the decision (in this study, the ratio
of loan loss reserves to total loans). This is probably the most
widely used loss function. In light of the problem under study,
however, the symmetry of the squared-error loss becomes a problem. It
seems that the penalties associated with overestimating the ratio of
loan losses to total loans should be smaller than the penalties
resulting from underestimating it (i.e., write-offs of capital and
ultimate bankruptcy). Hence our interest in a generalized form of the
squared-error loss, known as weighted squared-error loss, which can be
written as
L(9,a) = w(9)(9-a) 2 (2)
2
where the squared error, (9-a)
,
is weighted by a function of 9,
reflecting the fact that the consequences of an estimation error will
vary according to the magnitude of the ratio of actual loan losses to
total loans.
The second major type of loss function of interest for this
research is the linear loss. A particular version of linear loss
function, known as the absolute error loss, is perhaps the most com-
mon. It can be written as
L(8,a) = |9-a|. (3)
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We can see Chat the symmetry of this loss function will cause the same
type of problems described above in connection with the squared-error
loss. Note, however, that in this case the penalties for large errors
will be less severe. This brings us to the generalized linear loss
function, which is of particular interest for this study, and has the
form
K (8-a) if 9 - a > 0,
L(8,a) =| (4)
K (a-9) if 9 - a <_ 0,
where K and K are constants, usually with different values, which
can be chosen to reflect the relative importance (or perceived
penalties) of underestimation and overestimation, respectively.
In principle, the weighted squared error loss and generalized
linear loss would be equally qualified to represent the bank's loss
function. They imply, however, very different decision rules with
respect to feasibility of use and intuitive meaning. This point will
be discussed in the next section. But let us first turn our attention
to the other fundamental component of this model, the prior distribu-
tion.
2.2 Prior Information
There are several techniques available for the subjective deter-
mination of a prior density. In light of the purposes of this study,
it seems appropriate to use the matching of a given functional form,
i.e., to assume that tt( 9) , the prior density for the unknown parameter
9, is of a given functional form, and then choose a particular density
-8-
of this form (i.e., its parameters) which most clearly matches prior
beliefs.
In the case of the loan loss reserve decisions of commercial
banks, both data-based and nondata-based information is available for
the construction of the prior distribution (see Figure 1). Data-based
prior information comes from a time series of ratios of loan loss
reserves to total loans, whereas nondata-based prior information rela-
tes to tax and regulatory considerations. In our empirical analysis,
we use only data-based prior information. It should be clear that
this implies gains in simplicity at the expense of neglecting poten-
tially relevant information. For reasons that will be apparent
below, in particular those relating to the use of conjugate priors,
the choice of a distribution to represent prior beliefs in this study
7 2 vfalls upon the univariate normal distribution, written as N(p,r ) : %
1 2
= R,=-°°<y<+°°, t >0, and
2 2
et I. J-\ 1 -(x-u) /2t ,_,.f(x|u,r ) = —— e (5)
(27T)
17
i
2
where u and T are the mean and variance of the prior distribution and
x is any given observation. The normal distribution is especially
suited to the use of conjugate distributions, for it produces a known
functional form for the posterior distribution. This will be
discussed in the next section.
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3. THE OPTIMAL BANK LOAN LOSS RESERVE DECISION
3. 1 The Posterior Distribution
Bayesian analysis consists basically of combining the prior infor-
mation tt( 9 ) and the contemporaneous (sample) information (x) into the
posterior distribution of 9 given x, i.e., tt( 9 |x) , from which all
decisions and inferences are made. This posterior distribution, then,
reflects the updated beliefs about 9 after observing the sample x.
As explained above, in this work the sample information comes from
a cross section of commercial banks of similar characteristics, par-
8
ticularly size. This procedure seems justified on the grounds that
it gives a better perspective of any given bank within a group of peer
banks, as opposed to focusing only on the present experience of a par-
ticular bank under study. On the other hand, by having the latest
information coming from a sample as opposed to only one observation, a
bias is built into the Bayesian method which gives more weight to the
9
contemporaneous information and less weight to the prior information.
If both the prior distribution and the contemporaneous information
come from the same family of distributions, i.e., if we have conjugate
families, then in some cases it is possible to obtain simple
expressions for the parameters of the posterior distribution as func-
tions of the parameters of the prior and the likelihood function. In
particular, if both are normally distributed, it can be shown that
-1
tt(6|x) ~jf (u(x),p ), where
2 2
/ s o /n , T — f , NU(
^
=
; 2 2, ;
u +
; 2 r. ;
x> (6)
(t +a /n) (t +0 /n)
P = (m +0 )/t a
,
(7)
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and ir(9) ~ /(u,t 2 ), X - (X. , . . . ,X ) ~ /(9,a2 ). Note that X ~
9 i i
y/(9,a /n) . In sura, the precision ' measures of the prior and the
sample information function as weights when computing the parameters
of the posterior distribution of 8 given a sample x = (x.,...,x ).
The use of conjugate priors is appealing because it allows one to
start with a prior of a given functional form and end up with a
posterior distribution of the same functional form, but with param-
eters updated by the sample information.
The next step in the Bayesian analysis is predicated on the fact
that the posterior distribution supposedly contains all available
information about the parameter of interest 9 (i.e., the ratio of loan
losses to total loans). Therefore, any inferences or decisions con-
cerning 9 should be made solely through the posterior distribution.
At this juncture the loss function plays a crucial role, as shown
below.
3.2 The Bayes Rule
12
The derivation of the Bayes rule involves finding a decision rule
which minimizes Bayes risk, defined as the lowest bound for the risk
(i.e., the expected loss) of all decisions. Any Bayes decision,
therefore, will be an optimal decision because the risk, or expected
loss, cannot be smaller for any other decision. It is possible to
13demonstrate that minimizing Bayes risk is equivalent to minimizing
the expected loss with respect to tt(9|x), the posterior distribution
of 9 given x. This is to say that a Bayes rule minimizes the posterior
expected loss of the action a. This quantity to be minimized is the
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same as the one which is called (somewhat loosely) "average loss" in
Figure 1.
In order to obtain specific Bayes rules, it becomes necessary to
spell out the loss function that applies to the problem under study.
As discussed above, in this study two types of loss function are of
interest: the weighted squared-error loss and the generalized linear
loss. The Bayes rules for these loss functions turn out to be the
14
following. Consider first the weighted squared-error loss. If
2
L(9,a) = w(9)(9-a)
,
the Bayes rule is
6 *(x ) =
E
T(e
|
X) lM8)l
= J
9 w(6)f(xl9)dF 7r(8)
E
u(9
l
x)
[ w(9)] Jw( 9)f (x| 9)dF 7T ( 9)
where tt( 9 jx) is the posterior distribution, as before, and f(x|9) is
the likelihood function which gives rise to the contemporaneous
(sample) information. This Bayes rule can be interpreted as a ratio
of weighted averages of the prior distribution. Given the objectives
of this study, however, this decision rule presents serious problems:
first, because it does not suggest intuitively any particular location
parameter or fractile of the posterior distribution; secondly, because
of the disturbing presence of the (unknown) parameter of interest in
the weight function.
The generalized linear loss offers a more interesting result. For
this loss function,
K (9-a) if 9 - a > 0,
L(9,a) =
{ (4)
K (a-9) if 9 - a <_ 0,
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it turns out that any (K /(K +K )) fractile of tt( 9 1 x) is a Bayes esti-
mate of 9. This result has several appealing features given the
problem of estimating the ratio of loan losses to total loans in
commercial banks. First, it is intuitive: it is relatively easy to
conceptualize a fractile of a p.d.f. Second, it allows for asymmetric
penalties for overestimation and underestimation to be reflected in
the optimal decision rule, since they are captured in the weights K
and K of the loss function or, more appropriately, in the K_/K.
.
16
ratio.
To summarize, we have shown that, under reasonable assumptions
with respect to the choice of a loss function and of a prior distribu-
tion of the ratio of loan losses reserves to total loans, a Bayes
decision rule for the optimal ratio of loan loss reserves to total
loans emerges which is both theoretically sound and intuitive. In the
next section, this methodology is applied to a sample of large U.S.
commercial banks in an effort to identify patterns of decisions with
respect to loan loss reserves and the perceived weights or penalties
associated with underestimation and overestimation. In addition, our
empirical results also address the question of optimality of those
decisions, given the information sets represented by the prior distri-
bution and sample information, resulting in a posterior distribution
for the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans.
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4. DATA AND RESULTS
A sample of the largest 100 banks in 1986 was selected from
yearend Reports of Condition filed with federal banking regulators by
all insured banks. The final sample consists of the 82 banks that
appeared in yearend data with the same bank identifier code for each
year 1972 through 1986.
The ratio of each bank's yearend loan loss reserve to its total
loans (hereafter loss reserve ratios) was calculated for each of these
15 years. Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviation of the
loss reserve ratios and the average total assets for the 82 bank
sample for each of the 15 years. It is interesting to observe that
the average loss reserve ratio started relatively high in 1972,
declined through 1978, and then increased through 1986, approaching
its 1972 level. The yearly standard deviations are relatively stable
except for the years 1983 and 1986 when they doubled in size. Figure
2 presents frequency histograms of the 82 loss reserve ratios for
each of the years 1982 through 1985.
Chi square tests were conducted to determine if the null hypothe-
sis of normality could be rejected for any of the 14 cross section
distributions (1972-1985) of loss reserve ratios. Only in 1983 was
the null hypothesis rejected at the 1 percent level. A few extreme
values along with substantial kurtosis caused rejection of the null
hypothesis
.
Following the methodology described in the previous section,
posterior distributions were constructed for each bank for four con-
secutive years assuming conjugate normal distributions. For example,
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the first set of posterior distributions consisted of the 1972 through
1982 time series of yearend loss reserve ratios for each bank as the
prior distributions and the cross section distribution of loss reserve
ratios for all 82 banks in 1982 for the likelihood function
(contemporaneous information). Therefore, 82 unique posterior distri-
butions constituted the first set. This procedure was repeated to
create a second set of 82 posterior distributions using the 1972
through 1983 time series of loss reserve ratios for each bank and the
1983 cross section of loss reserve ratios. The same procedure was
repeated two more times, with the time series being lengthened by one
year each time and the 1984 and 1985 cross sections being used.
As anticipated in footnote 9, the means of the posterior distribu-
tions were dominated by the mean of the cross section or sample infor-
mation. In terms of Equation 6, the weight placed on x was on the
order of .95 to .98 indicating the importance of the contemporaneous
information in making the loss reserve decision. In addition the
posterior distributions have small variances relative to the cross
section and time series distributions. Figure 3 illustrates this
result by showing the time series distribution (1972-1982), the cross
section distribution (1982), and the resulting posterior distribution
for one bank.
The posterior distributions reflect the data-based information
available to managers as they make their decisions about the next
period's loan loss provision, and hence the loss reserve ratio. The
actual loss reserve decision for each bank was located in its
posterior distribution. For example, a bank's actual 1983 loss
-15-
reserve ratio was treated as a drawing from its posterior distribution
which was constructed using the 1972 through 1982 time series data for
the bank and the 1982 cross section data for all 82 banks. The loca-
tion of this actual value was summarized as the percentage of the
distribution to the left of the actual value, y percent (see footnote
16).
Following the procedure in footnote 16, four K„/K. ratios were
calculated for each bank using its actual loss reserve ratios for each
year 1983 through 1986 and the associated posterior distributions.
These ratios allow us to characterize the actual decisions of each
bank. If the K_/K ratio takes on a value of less than 1, then K_ <
K which indicates that the bank places greater weight (cost or
penalty) on attaining a loss reserve ratio that is "too large" rather
than "too small." We have used the label "aggressive" to describe
this behavior. If the K-VK. ratio takes on a value greater than 1,
then K„ > K. which indicates the placing of greater penalty on being
under reserved. This behavior has been given the label
"conservative."
Table 2 provides some summary information on the values of the
K„/K. ratio. Columns 2 and 3 present the number and percent of sample
banks with K_/K ratios between 1 and 200, which encompasses 49.5 per-
cent of the upper tail of the posterior distributions. Columns 4 and
5 present the number and percent of sample banks with K^/K. ratios
between 0.005 and 1. The tail to the left 0.005 constitutes only 0.5
percent of the mass of the posterior distribution. All other banks
-16-
had K /K values in the tails of their respective posterior distribu-
tions, i.e., less than 0.005 or greater than 200.
Many banks demonstrated extreme values for the K-/K. ratio, i.e.,
values that fall outside 99 percent of the posterior distribution, for
the 1983-1986 period. Given the choice of the loss function, these
loan loss reserve decisions are considered suboptimal in a statistical
sense. Note, however, that this result follows basically from the
fact that the variance of the posterior distribution is much smaller
than the variances of the prior density or the cross sectional sample.
This, in turn, is implied by the use of the parameters of the sample
mean in the calculation of the parameters of the posterior density.
The implication is that the frequency of actual decisions which are
located within the posterior mass decreases dramatically.
An alternative procedure would be to use only the most recent loan
loss reserve ratio as the contemporaneous information for each indivi-
dual bank. The weight of this ample information would decrease
substantially and the variance of the posterior density would be of
about the same magnitude as that of the prior, as can be seen from
Equations (6) and (7) since, in this case, n = 1. The number of
seemingly optimal decisions would be much higher using this alter-
native procedure; however, this improvement in the results would come
at the expense of disregarding an important part of the bank manage-
ment's information set, that is, the actions of the set of peer banks.
Since K^/K. ratios are calculated over a 4-year period it is
possible to observe the consistency of bank loss reserve decisions
over time. If the value of K~/K. switches from greater than 1 to less
-17-
than 1 during a period of time, the bank lacks consistency in its
decision process. Table 3 addresses the consistency of loss reserve
decisions over the 1983-1986 period. Only 37 of the 82 banks made
consistent decisions where consistency is defined as continuously
aggressive or conservative during each of the four years. The
remaining 45 banks had K
n
/K ratio values that were not consistently
on one side of 1.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The major contribution of this paper is to lay out an intuitively
appealing model of the process by which managers of individual banks
determine the size of their loan loss reserve ratios. These decisions
are approached using the framework of a Bayesian decision model.
Using a generalized linear loss function decision rule for the optimal
ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans emerges.
Data for 82 large banks for the period 1972-1986 is used to exa-
mine actual decisions to infer the relative sizes of penalties for
overestimation and underestimation of the loss reserve ratios.
Results indicate that between 9 percent and 20 percent of the 82 banks
behaved as if the penalty for underestimation was larger than the
penalty for overestimation; another 5 percent to 21 percent made deci-
sions as if the penalty for overestimation were the larger penalty. A
large number of the loss reserve decisions were not optimal.
Shortcomings of this research include the use of annual data. In
fact managers would have more recent than one year old cross section
information on the decisions of peer banks. The use of quarterly data
-18-
may improve the results of this approach. The model used here was
based only on data-based information and did not take into account tax
considerations, examination results, and other information that may
influence the loss reserve decision. Finally, in order to construct
the posterior distributions, it was assumed that the prior and the
cross section distributions were normal. While tests of the cross
section distributions indicated that this was generally the case, the
prior distributions have too few data points to conduct such tests.
These limitations suggest possible extensions of this study.
Overall, perhaps the basic message of this paper is that the
application of statistical decision theory allows us to examine the
loan loss reserve decision in commercial banks from the individual
firm's viewpoint, as opposed to an aggregate point of view. In short,
the loan loss reserve decision is treated as a management controlled
variable within a framework of tax, regulatory, and market
constraints
.
-19-
NOTES
One recent study states that "the [loan] loss provision at large
banks cut the industry's returns on assets and equity in 1987 to about
one-fifth of their 1986 levels." See McLaughlin and Wolfson [1988],
p. 403.
?
"Consider the fact some banks actually make negative provisions at
times in an effort to adjust their loan loss reserves to their desired
levels. Negative provisions are difficult to rationalize. It seems
to be more sensible to focus on the loan loss reserve or a ratio of
loan loss reserve to total loans or net loans and treat the provision
for loan losses as a residual decision.
3
Recall that many observers seemed to agree that Citicorp's deci-
sion to allocate $3 billion to its loan loss reserve in the spring of
1987 put a great deal of pressure on other money center banks with a
large degree of exposure to Third World debt to follow suit.
4
In general, nondata-based prior information does not change the
functional form of the prior distribution but may change its parame-
ters.
There are many good references in the econometrics and statistics
literature which discuss Bayesian decision theory in detail. This
study has relied especially on DeGroot [1970] and Berger [1980],
Mindful of space limitations, we have attempted to keep this portion
of the study as short as possible. The reader is referred to the
above sources for a comprehensive discussion of the Bayesian methods.
Our notation generally follows Berger [1980].
A possible extension of this study would be to design a more
comprehensive empirical procedure which takes nondata-based prior
information into account.
This choice is not entirely arbitrary. Normality tests were per-
formed on the cross sectional data and the null hypothesis of nor-
mality could not be rejected (see Section 4 below). The small size of
the available time series of loan loss reserves to total loans, which
goes back only to 1972, prevents any serious attempt at resolving the
standard statistical problem of determining a density function from a
series of observations from that density. Hence the assumption of
normality for the prior distribution.
o
Other possible criteria for defining the sample of peer banks
would be location and similarities in the structure of the loans and
securities portfolio.
20-
This point becomes immediately apparent below when one realizes
that the distribution of the sample mean is utilized. The bigger the
sample, the smaller the variance of the sample mean. This improves
the precison of the contemporaneous information and adds to its weight
in the computation of the parameters of the posterior distribution.
10
A detailed treatment of this point is given in Berger [1980],
pp. 92-98.
Precision is defined as the inverse of the variance.
12
Bayesian analysis usually makes two assumptions at this point.
First, the prior p.d.f. is assumed to be proper or informative.
Second, the problem is assumed to have a finite Bayes risk. This
method is known as the extensive form of Bayesian analysis.
13
See Berger [1980], pp. 108-9, for a proof.
14
A derivation of these Bayes rules is presented in Berger [1980],
pp. 111-112.
This result implies that if Kq = K^ , i.e., the penalties for
overestimating or underestimating the ratio of loan losses to total
loans are perceived to be equal by the bank's management, then the
median of the posterior distribution is a Bayes decision. If the con-
jugate distributions are distributed normally, then, of course, this
is also equivalent to the mean of the posterior.
16Suppose we have a y (a/ . fractile of ir(9|x). Then (KQ /(K +K.)) =
l-y2
where y„ gives us the proportiony,.. Make K. = 1 to obtain K.
a, 1 y„
Ay
of the posterior distribution below the fractile y. When K~ = K
,
then y is equal to 1/2. This is the median of the posterior. For the
K
fractiles below the median, K < K and -r— < 1. Conversely, for the
U 1 i\
.
K
fractiles above the median, Kn > K and rr- > 1 (see the diagram
below). In our empirical tests, we will be ultimately interested in
the KQ /K. ratio.
K
Q
< K KQ
> Kj
1.0
K
o
= K
i
+ 0O
-21-
l7
This portion of the information set might change the parameters
of the prior distribution (see footnote 4).
-22-
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FIGURE 2
FREQUENCY HISTOGRAMS OF LOSS RESERVE RATIOS
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Table 1
82 Bank. Sample Values
Average
Loan Loss Reserve Ratio Total Assets
Year Mean Std Dev (thousands)
1972 1.743% 0.3727% $1,811,314
1973 1.691% 0.3010% 2,212,782
1974 1.687% 0.2987% 2,242,175
1975 1.685% 0.2990% 2,212,040
1976 1.275% 0.4147% 2,408,552
1977 1.225% 0.3439% 2,649,277
1978 1.051% 0.2480% 4,741,077
1979 1.113% 0.2866% 5,442,852
1980 1.149% 0.3245% 6,057,804
1981 1.170% 0.3279% 6,933,696
1982 1.234% 0.3744% 12,815,100
1983 1.369% 0.6102% 13,230,700
1984 1.320% 0.3500% 14,096,150
1985 1.4 32% 0.3483% 15,187,520
1986 1.652% 0.6157% 16,448,830
Table 2
Number and Percentage of Banks at the Critical
Values of the Posterior Distribution
Conservative Banks
with
1 < K0/K1 < 200
Aggressive Banks
with
0.005 < K0/K1 < 1
Number /o or Number % of
Year of Banks Sample of Banks Sample
1983 8 9.8% 16 19.5%
1984 13 15.9% 17 20.7%
1985 16 19.5% 4 4.9%
1986 7 8.5% 7 8.5%
Sample size 82
Table 3
Consistency of Bank Loss Reserve Decisions
for the years 1982-1985
Sample size 82
Number Percentage
of Banks of Sample
Consistently
Conservative 1 > K0/K1 19 23.2%
Consistently
Aggressive < K0/K1 < 1 18 22.0%
Not Consistent 45 54.9%
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